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Energy	   storage	   seems	   set	   to	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   managing	   and	   balancing	   the	   future	  
electricity	  system.	  Storage	  can	  act	  as	  a	  generator	  and	  as	  a	  load,	  providing	  both	  energy	  and	  
ancillary	   services	   such	  as	   fast	   frequency	   response	  and	  operating	   reserve.	   Therefore,	   it	   can	  
provide	   the	   desired	   flexibility	   for	   the	   network.	   Current	   mechanism	   designs	   do	   not	   take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  a	  given	  storage	  facility	  and	  the	  auctions	  used	  to	  buy	  and	  
sell	   potential	   storage	   products	   have	   design	   flaws.	   This	   paper	   gives	   an	   overview	   of	   how	  
storage	  products	  are	  bought	  and	  sold	  today	  and	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  current	  designs.	  It	  then	  
presents	  a	  new	  mechanism	  design	  to	  integrate	  storage	  in	  the	  most	  efficient	  way,	  based	  on	  
social	  welfare.	  
	  




Energy	  storage	  is	  potentially	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  electricity	  system.	  This	  
is	  because	  an	  electricity	  system	  characterised	  by	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  low	  carbon	  intermittent	  
renewable	  generation	  technology	  and/or	  base-­‐load	  nuclear	  and	  carbon	  capture	  and	  storage	  
plants	  will	  be	  much	  less	  able	  to	  follow	  demand.	  The	  absence	  of	  flexible	  fossil	  fuel	  plants	  on	  
the	   electricity	   system	   will	   mean	   that	   flexibility	   will	   need	   to	   be	   supplied	   by	   storage	  
technologies.	  A	  recent	  study	  for	  the	  National	  Infrastructure	  Commission	  in	  the	  UK	  suggested	  
that	  a	  flexible	  electricity	  system	  could	  be	  of	  the	  order	  of	  £8bn	  p.a.	  cheaper	  than	  a	  business	  
as	  usual	  system	  by	  2030	  (Strbac	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  	  Storage	  units	  can	  be	  sources	  of	  load	  at	  times	  
of	   excess	   supply	   and	   sources	   of	   supply	   at	   times	   of	   excess	   demand.	   They	   can	   also	   provide	  
other	  non-­‐energy	  electricity	  products	  (such	  as	  fast	  voltage	  support	  or	  reactive	  power).	  The	  
key	  market	   design	   question	   around	   storage	   is	   how	   to	   appropriately	   involve	   storage	   units	  
                                           
1 The	   authors	   acknowledge	   the	   financial	   support	   of	   the	   EPSRC	   Business,	   Economics,	   Planning	   and	   Policy	   for	  
Energy	  Storage	  in	  Low-­‐Carbon	  Futures	  (BEPP-­‐Store)	  project	  (Grant	  No.	  EP/L014386/1).	  The	  authors	  acknowledge	  
the	   helpful	   comments	   of	   one	   anonymous	   reviewer	   and	   Goran	   Strbac.	   The	   usual	   disclaimer	   applies.	   EPSRC	  
research	  data	  statement:	  there	  is	  no	  additional	  data	  beyond	  that	  reported	  in	  the	  paper.	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within	   energy	   and	   other	   electricity	   service	   auctions.	   Current	   market	   designs	   tend	   to	   run	  
separate	   auctions	   for	   different	   energy	   products	   (where	   they	   run	   auctions	   at	   all).	   Future	  
market	   designs	   could	   and	   should	   use	   auctions	   which	   simultaneously	   clear	   multi-­‐product	  
markets	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   bids	   from	   units	   capable	   of	   producing	   and	   demanding	   a	   range	   of	  
electricity	   products.	   This	   paper	   explores	   one	   such	   auction/mechanism	   design,	   a	   double-­‐
sided	   Vickrey-­‐Clarke-­‐Groves	   mechanism	   (VCG	   mechanism),	   that	   would	   allow	   the	  
participation	   of	   storage	   units	   capable	   of	   both	   buying	   and	   selling	   energy	   and	   providing	  
reserve	   capacity.	   	   The	   VCG	   is	   built	   up	   around	   an	   allocation	   rule	   (of	   the	   objects	   for	   sale	  
between	  buyers	  and	  sellers)	  and	  a	  payment	  rule	  where	  payments	  are	  determined.	  Payments	  
are	  set	  independently	  of	  each	  bidder’s	  own	  submitted	  bids	  to	  ensure	  truth-­‐telling	  (Krishna,	  
2009).	  We	  illustrate	  clearly	  how	  this	  mechanism	  works	  in	  our	  examples	  below.	  
	  
II. STORAGE	  OF	  TODAY	  
	  
A. Storage	  products	  and	  the	  mechanism	  used	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  them	  	  
Storage	   has	   the	   advantage	   of	   providing	   the	   flexibility	   to	   balance	   the	   electricity	   system.	  
This	   is	  because	  storage	  offers	  fast	  response	  to	  the	  system,	  as	  opposed	  to	   just	  energy	  price	  
arbitrage.	   However,	   is	   the	   mechanism	   design	   used	   for	   selling	   reserve	   products	   the	   right	  
design	   to	  achieve	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  and/or	  one	  which	  optimises	  production	   costs	  and	  
consumption	  decisions?	  This	  depends	  on	   the	  products	   for	   sale	   and	   the	  mechanism	  design	  
used	  to	  sell	  them.	  
Potential	   storage	   products	   (hereafter	   just	   ‘products’)	   are	   offered	   together	   with	   other	  
energy	   products.	   These	   products	   are	   designed	   for	   different	   purposes	   to	   help	   the	   System	  
Operator	   (SO)	   optimising	   the	   system.	   The	   following	   tables	   show	   the	   products	   currently	  
offered2,	  the	  auction	  used	  to	  procure	  them	  and	  how	  often	  they	  are	  conducted3.	  We	  are	  only	  






                                           
2	  National	  Grid	  will	  be	  contracting	  a	  new	  service	  in	  April	  2016	  -­‐	  Enhanced	  Frequency	  Response	  (EFR)	  –	  a	  product	  
to	  provide	  frequency	  response	  within	  1	  second.	  
3	  The	  tables	  are	  based	  on	  our	  interpretation	  of	  the	  different	  publicly	  available	  documents.	  
4	  National	  Grid	  offers	  non-­‐tendered	  products	  such	  as	  “Mandatory	  Frequency	  Response”	  and	  “Fast	  Start”,	  among	  
others	  (NG,	  2014/2015).	  
 3 
Table	  1	  
Products	  in	  GB	  
Product1	   Feature	   Mechanism	   Conducted	  
Firm	  Fast	  Reserve	   Response	  within	  2min,	  
duration	  at	  least	  
15min3	  	  




240min,	  duration	  at	  
least	  2h5	  
Pay-­‐as-­‐bid4	   3	  tenders	  per	  year5	  
Firm	  Frequency	  
Response	  
(LF1):	  Response	  within	  
10s,	  duration	  at	  least	  
20s	  
(LF2):	  Response	  within	  
30s,	  duration	  at	  least	  
30s	  
(HF):	  Response	  within	  
10s,	  duration	  is	  
indefinitely8	  
Pay-­‐as-­‐bid7	   Monthly6	  	  
Reactive	  Power	  
Voltage	  control	   Scoring,	  Pay-­‐as-­‐bid9,10	   Every	  6	  months1	  
Note	  1:	  NG	  (2014/2015),	  Note	  2:	  NG	  (2013),	  Note	  3:	  	  NG	  (2016a),	  Note	  4:	  NG	  (2015a),	  Note	  5:	  NG	  (2015b),	  Note	  
6:	  NG	  (2015c),	  Note	  7:	  NG	  (2014a),	  Note	  8:	  NG	  (2014b),	  LF1:	  low	  frequency,	  primary	  response,	  LF2:	  low	  

















Products	  in	  ISO-­‐NE	  
Product1	  
Feature	   Mechanism	   Conducted	  
Regulation	  Market	   Increase	  or	  decrease	  
every	  4s1	  
Uniform-­‐price,	  
highest	  offer	  sets	  the	  
price2	  
Daily2	  
Forward	  Reserve	  Market	   TMNSR:	  Response	  
within	  10min	  
TMOR:	  Response	  with	  
30min3,4	  
Uniform-­‐price3	   Every	  6	  months3	  
Real-­‐Time	  Reserve	  
Pricing	  
First	  contingency	  loss:	  	  
100%	  delivery	  within	  
10min6	  
Second	  contingency	  
loss:	  50%	  delivery	  with	  
30min6	  
Uniform-­‐price6,5	   Daily6	  
Voltage	  Support	   Voltage	  Control	   Generator’s	  claimed	  
capacity5	  
Annually5	  
Note	  1:	   ISO-­‐NE	   (2014),	  Note	  2:	   ISO-­‐NE	   (2013a),	  Note	  3:	   ISO-­‐NE	   (2013b),	  Note	  4:	   ISO-­‐NE	   (2016),	  Note	  5:	   ISO	  
(2015a),	  Note	  6:	  ISO-­‐NE	  (2015b)	  
	  
This	   paper	   is	   interested	   in	   the	   number	   of	   products	   offered	   to	   illustrate	   the	   need	   for	  
simultaneous	  market	  clearing	  in	  multi-­‐product	  markets.	  GB	  and	  ISO-­‐NE	  offer	  four	  products.	  
However,	  future	  market	  will	  consider	  more	  products.	  To	  support	  this,	  Ireland	  is	  in	  a	  process	  
of	  designing	  a	  new	  electricity	  market,	  including	  a	  range	  of	  new	  electricity	  products.	  Currently	  
(see	   Appendix),	   they	   have	   seven	   products,	   but	   are	   discussing	   the	   need	   for	   more	   (SEM,	  
2013)6.	  	  
Overall,	  system	  operators	  seem	  interested	  in	  defining	  many	  products	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  
individual	   products	   are	   designed	   for	   different	   purposes	   and	   procured	   over	   different	   time	  
intervals.	   They	  depend	  on	  what	   the	   SO	  may	  need	   to	   ensure	  delivery	   and	   reliability	   of	   the	  
                                           
5	  According	  to	  ISO-­‐NE	  (2015b,	  p.11),	  prices	  (and	  quantities)	  are	  based	  on	  the	  real-­‐time	  energy	  offers	  of	  resources	  
and	  not	  separate	  real-­‐time	  reserve	  offers.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  price	  (and	  consequent	  quantity)	  is	  set	  at	  
the	  intersection	  between	  supply	  and	  demand.	  
6	  As	  part	  of	  the	  design	  process,	  a	  suggestion	  for	  a	  new	  package	  auction	  design	  has	  been	  proposed	  by	  a	  consulting	  
firm	  (DotEcon,	  2015).	  The	  set	  up	  is	  different	  from	  ours	  and	  its	  properties	  are	  not	  formally	  laid	  out,	  so	  we	  would	  
expect	  it	  to	  deliver	  different	  outcomes	  from	  ours.	  
 5 
network.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  product	  can	  work	  well	  for	  batteries	  and	  another	  one	  for	  pump-­‐
storage.	  
	  
B. Problems	  of	  current	  mechanism	  designs	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  lessons	  from	  existing	  systems	  is	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  run	  separate	  auctions	  
for	   distinct	   energy	   products.	   There	   is	   no	   coordination	   between	   the	   different	   sales	   of	  
electricity	  products	  or	  between	  auctions	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  no	  simultaneous	  clearing	  
process	   across	   auctions/product	   markets.	   Failure	   to	   simultaneously	   clear	   interrelated	  
markets	  is	  a	  source	  of	  inefficiency.	  Inefficiency	  arises	  when,	  for	  example,	  a	  bidder	  can	  learn	  
from	  already	  conducted	  auctions	  to	  place	  a	  higher	  untruthful	  price	  on	  a	  product	  where	  there	  
is	   expected	   to	   be	   less	   competition.	   The	   bidder	   can	   therefore	   gain	   from	   knowing	   what	  
markets	  may	  be	  less	  competitive.	  
At	   least	   one	   way	   forward	   is	   to	   ensure	   a	   simultaneous	   clearing	   process	   across	  
auctions/products	  and	  to	  give	  units	  the	  opportunity	  to	  submit	  package	  bids	  (submit	  bids	  on	  
a	  group	  of	  products).	  This	  feature	  is	  important	  in	  the	  area	  of	  electricity	  where	  gains	  are	  to	  be	  
earned	  from	  cost	  synergies.	  
Furthermore,	   products	   are	   designed	   for	   different	   purposes	   and	   conducted	   for	   different	  
time	   intervals.	   They	   are	   designed	   for	   what	   the	  market	   and	   the	   SO	  may	   need	   in	   order	   to	  
ensure	  delivery	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  network.	  Given	  these	  features,	  the	  markets	  are	  still	  not	  
fully	  designed	   to	   reflect	   the	   full	   capabilities	  of	  new	  electrical	  energy	   storage	   (such	  as	  grid-­‐
scale	   batteries)	   and	   its	   features.	   Storage	   has	   the	   special	   feature	   of	   being	   able	   to	   be	   a	  
supplier	   (generator)	   and	   demander	   (load)	   of	   electricity.	   The	   feature	  makes	   storage	   useful	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  SO	  to	  balance	  the	  system.	  Current	  systems	  do	  not	  allow	  a	  given	  
unit	  to	  simultaneously	  act	  as	  a	  supplier,	  demander	  and/or	  as	  reserve	  capacity.	  	  
A	  SO	   is	   interested	   in	  balancing	   the	   system.	  The	  existing	   systems	  do	  not	  allow	   the	  SO	   to	  
express	   consistent	   preferences	   on	   the	   products	   for	   sale.	   The	   supply	   and	   prices	   are	  
determined	   via	   bids	   submitted	   by	   suppliers	   and	   demanders.	   If	   a	   SO	   is	   to	   be	   allowed	   to	  
balance	   a	   system	   in	   an	   efficient	   way,	   it	   needs	   to	   express	   complex	   preferences	   (a	   utility	  
function)	  for	  different	  types	  of	  products.	  	  
The	  current	  auction	  designs	  used	   today	  have	  problems.	   Importantly,	   they	  are	  not	  based	  
on	   economic	   welfare	   (Krishna,	   2009).	   The	   focus	   seems	   only	   to	   be	   lowest	   possible	   price.	  
Often,	  price	  minimisation	  and	  economic	  welfare	  cannot	  be	  achieved	  simultaneously	   (Zhan,	  
2008).	  Indeed	  attempts	  to	  minimise	  price	  in	  the	  short	  run,	  may	  cause	  bidders	  to	  strategically	  
alter	   their	   bids	   upwards	   (i.e.	   bid	   untruthfully),	   thus	   raising	   prices	   in	   the	   longer	   run.	   The	  
 6 
literature	  discusses	  how	   to	   characterise	  electricity	   service.	   Is	   electricity,	  with	  all	   its	   energy	  
and	   power	   quality,	   characteristics	   as	   a	   private	   good	   or	   as	   a	   public	   good?	   The	   conclusion	  
seems	   to	   be	   that	   the	   delivery	   and	   reliability	   characteristics	   should	   be	   identified	   as	   being	  
public	  goods,	  whereas	  real	  power	  and	  reactive	  power	  are	  technically	  private	  goods	  (Kiesling,	  
L.	  and	  Giberson,	  M.,	  1997;	  Joskow,	  P.	  and	  Tirole,	  J.,	  2007;	  Schulze	  W.	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
A	  step	  forward	  in	  ensuring	  a	  welfare	  optimum	  is	  to	  illicit	  truth-­‐telling	  from	  bidding	  storage	  
units.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  all	  units	  state	  true	  willingness	  to	  pay	  (WTP)	  and	  cost,	  the	  mechanism	  
can	  place	  the	  electricity	  products	  for	  sale	   in	  the	  hands	  of	  those	  who	  value	  them	  the	  most.	  
This	   is	   an	   issue	   in	   current	   systems,	  where	   none	   of	   the	   currently	   used	  mechanism	   designs	  
fully	   incentivise	   bidders	   to	   reveal	   true	  WTP	   and	   cost	   and	   allocate	   the	   electricity	   products	  
efficiently.	  Therefore,	  the	  welfare	  optimum	  may	  not	  be	  achieved.	  
The	  auction	  designs	  used	  today	  have	  elements	  of	  cost	   inefficiency.	  Take	  for	  example	  the	  
uniform-­‐price	  double	  auction	  for	  wholesale	  electricity	  energy	  and	  consider	  an	  environment	  
of	  many	  small	  and	  cheaper	  units	  and	  one	  bigger	  more	  expensive	  unit.	  It	  can	  be	  shown	  that	  a	  
uniform-­‐price	   across	   an	   area	   (maybe	   a	   constrained	   area)	   means	   an	   unnecessarily	   high	  
cost/price	   for	   all	   final	   consumers	   since	   the	  more	   expensive	   unit	   by	   itself	  will	   increase	   the	  
price	  for	  the	  whole	  market.	  	  
	  
III. A	  FRAMEWORK	  ON	  HOW	  TO	  IMPLEMENT	  A	  VCG	  MECHANISM	  FOR	  STORAGE	  
	  
We	  suggest	  the	  use	  of	  multiple	  markets,	  including	  a	  range	  of	  reserve	  markets	  along	  with	  the	  
day-­‐ahead	   energy	   market.	   The	   reserve	   markets	   (hereafter	   reserve	   market)	   will	   contain	  
products	  designed	  only	  for	  reserve	  capacity.	  Reserve	  market	  products	  will	  be	  sold	  via	  a	  new	  
design	  –	  a	  double-­‐sided	  VCG	  mechanism,	  which	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  an	  allocation	  rule	  to	  find	  
the	  winners	  of	  the	  assignment	  process	  and	  a	  payment	  rule	  to	  determine	  the	  payments.	  We	  
simultaneously	   determine	   allocation	   and	   pricing	   across	   products,	   and	   package	   bidding	   is	  
allowed.	   Thus,	   each	   storage	   facility	   simultaneously	   bids	   into	   multiple	   markets.	   The	  
mechanism	   is	   based	   on	   social	   welfare	   and	   achieves	   by	   itself	   truth-­‐telling,	   individual	  
rationality	  and	  efficiency.	  There	  will	  be	  a	  price	  per	  provider,	  not	  a	  uniform-­‐price.	  Contracts	  
(to	   sell	   products)	   will	   be	   to	   deliver	   to	   the	   reserve	   market,	   and/or	   to	   deliver	   to	   the	   day-­‐
ahead/energy	   market	   to	   increase	   competition.	   A	   storage	   unit	   can	   be	   supplier	   as	   well	   as	  
demander	  of	  electricity	  in	  the	  assignment	  procedure.	  The	  SO	  submits	  offers	  and	  therefore,	  it	  
is	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  express	  preferences	  on	  offered	  contracts.	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A. Examples7	  
Consider	  the	  environment	  of	  one	  SO	  and	  four	  bidders	  –	  Storage	  1	  to	  4	  (hereafter	  S1-­‐S4).	  
Let	  S1	  and	  S2	  be	  demanders	  of	  electricity	  and	  S3	  and	  S4	  be	  suppliers	  of	  electricity.	  Suppose	  
two	   contracts	   are	   for	   sale,	   namely	   a	   contract	   to	   provide	   electricity	   to	   the	   energy	  market	  
(EM),	   totalling	  2	  MWh,	  and	  a	   contract	   to	  provide	   reserve	   capacity	   (FFR),	   totalling	  2	  MWh.	  
Assume	  also	  that	  each	  demander	  wants	  2	  MWh	  and	  each	  supplier	  has	  2	  MWh	  they	  want	  to	  
sell.	  These	  products	  give	  the	  SO	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ensure	  reserve	  capacity	  and	  to	  increase	  
competition	  in	  the	  EM.	  The	  following	  shows	  two	  examples.	  The	  first	  example	  ends	  up	  having	  
two	  winners,	  whereas	  the	  second	  example	  has	  one	  winner.	  
	  
Example	  1	  
Table	  3	  shows	  the	  submitted	  offers	  and	  bids.	  The	  SO,	  S1	  and	  S2	  submit	  preferences/WTP,	  
marked	  with	  a	  plus.	  S3	  and	  S4	  submit	  costs	  to	  be	  paid	  by	  the	  final	  consumers,	  market	  with	  a	  
minus.	  
Table	  3	  
Submitted	  offers	  and	  bids	  




EM/2	  MWh	  +	  FFR/2	  
MWh	  
(£/MWh)	  
SO	   110	   150	   -­‐	  
S1	   120	   -­‐	   250	  
S2	   -­‐	   120	   240	  
S3	   -­‐90	   -­‐110	   -­‐200	  
S4	   -­‐100	   -­‐100	   -­‐190	  
	  
Table	  3	  shows,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  SO	  has	  submitted	  preferences	  on	  both	  contracts.	   It	  
shows	   that	   it	  prefers	   reserve	  capacity	  with	   the	  higher	  bid	  of	  £150	  compared	   to	   the	  bid	  of	  
£110.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   expects	   a	   competitive	   EM.	   Interestingly,	   S1-­‐S4	   have	   submitted	  
package	  bids	  combined	  of	  EM	  and	  FFR.	  
Using	  the	  VCG	  mechanism,	  the	  allocation	  rule	  suggests	  that	  S1	  and	  S3	  are	  the	  winners	  of	  
contract	  EM	  (S1	  buys	  from	  S3)	  and	  SO	  and	  S4	  are	  the	  winners	  of	  contract	  FFR	  (SO	  buys	  from	  
S4).	  This	  is	  the	  allocation	  that	  maximises	  the	  difference	  between	  submitted	  offers	  and	  bids:	  
(£120+£150)-­‐(£90+£100)=£80.	  This	   is	  because	   the	  VCG	  mechanism	  allocates	   the	  object	   for	  
                                           
7	   Throughout	   this	   paper,	   we	   assume	   (1)	   no	   learning	   between	   assignment	   procedures,	   (2)	   units	   cannot	   bid	   as	  
being	  supplier	  and	  demander	  on	   the	  same	  time,	   (3)	   there	  are	  no	  budget	  constraints	  and	   (4)	  products	  are	  pre-­‐
defined.	  These	  assumptions	  can	  be	  relaxed	  or	  justified	  in	  subsequent	  work.	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sale	   to	  highest	   value	  bidders	  and	  procures	   it	   from	   the	   cheapest	   sellers.	   The	  VCG	  payment	  
rule	   suggests	   that	   S1	   and	   S0	   pay	   £110	   and	   £120	   and	   S3	   and	   S4	   are	   paid	   £100	   and	   £110.	  	  
Hence,	   the	  network	  cost	  by	   itself	   is	  £210	   (£100+£110).	  The	   simplified	  example	   shows	   that	  
buyers	   pay	   the	   second	  highest	   price	   and	   sellers	   receive	   the	   next	   lowest	   bidder’s	   bid.	   This	  
ensures	  that	  both	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  bid	  truthfully.	  
	  
Example	  2	  
Compared	  to	  Table	  3,	  S1	  has	  changed	  its	  package	  bid	  from	  £250	  to	  £290.	  	  
	  
Table	  4	  
Submitted	  offers	  and	  bids	  




EM/2	  MWh	  +	  FFR/2	  
MWh	  
(£/MWh)	  
SO	   110	   150	   -­‐	  
S1	   120	   -­‐	   290	  
S2	   -­‐	   120	   240	  
S3	   -­‐90	   -­‐110	   -­‐200	  
S4	   -­‐100	   -­‐100	   -­‐190	  
	  
The	  allocation	  rule	  now	  suggests	   that	  S1	  and	  S4	  are	   the	  winners	  of	  both	  contracts	  since	  
£290-­‐£190=£100	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   £270-­‐£190=£80	   from	   Table	   4.	   The	   payment	   rule	  
suggests	  that	  S1	  pays	  £240	  and	  S4	  is	  paid	  £200.	  The	  package	  bids	  are	  of	  interest	  because	  the	  
network	  cost	  is	  now	  £200	  instead	  of	  the	  £210	  from	  having	  two	  different	  winners/suppliers.	  
Notice	   that	   both	   examples	   have	   a	   VCG	   surplus	   -­‐	   Example	   1	   with	   a	   total	   surplus	   of	  
(110+120)-­‐(100+110)=20	  and	  Example	  2	  with	  a	  surplus	  of	  (£240-­‐£200)=£40.	  	  
	  
	  
IV. INTERCONNECTORS	  BETWEEN	  DIFFERENT	  COUNTRIES	  
	  
Until	  now,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  paper	  has	  been	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  electricity	  storage	  products	  
within	  a	  system	  controlled	  by	  a	  single	  SO.	  However,	  the	  VCG	  mechanism	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  
contain	  several	  SOs.	  This	  makes	  our	  mechanism	  useful	  in	  other	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  allocation	  
of	   electricity	   interconnector	   use.	   For	   example,	   take	   Great	   Britain	   (GB)	   that	   currently	   has	  
 9 
interconnectors	   to	   France,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Northern	   Ireland	   and	   the	   Republic	   of	   Ireland	  
(Ofgem,	  2014)	  and	  will	  have	  them	  to	  Belgium,	  Norway	  and	  Denmark	  by	  2022	  (Ofgem,	  2016).	  	  
Our	  presented	  mechanism	  should	   in	   this	  context	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  clearing	  process	  across	  
product	  markets	   and	   across	   counties,	   that	   is,	   coupling	   different	  markets	   into	   one	  market.	  
Different	   national	   SOs	   are	   given	   the	   opportunity	   to	   express	   preferences	   towards	   the	  
products	   needed	   to	  manage	   their	   own	  networks	   and	   suppliers	   are	   assumed	   to	  be	   able	   to	  
deliver	  across	  countries	  without	  diverse	  administrative	  procedures.	  	  
Based	  on	  Table	  4,	  suppose	  now	  that	  we	  have	  two	  SOs	  (for	  example,	  the	  SO	  in	  GB,	  marked	  
as	  SO(GB),	  and	  the	  SO	   in	  France,	  marked	  as	  SO(France))	  and	   five	  bidders	  –	  Storage	  1	   to	  5,	  
where	   four	  of	   the	   five	  are	   in	  GB	   (as	   in	  Table	  4)	  and	  one	   is	   from	  France	   (hereafter	  S1(GB)-­‐
S4(GB)	  and	  S(France)).	  Let	  S1(GB)	  and	  S2(GB)	  be	  demanders	  of	  electricity	  and	  S3(GB),	  S4(GB)	  
and	  S(France)	  be	  suppliers	  of	  electricity.	  Table	  5	  shows	  the	  submitted	  offers	  and	  bids.	  
	  
Table	  5	  
Submitted	  offers	  and	  bids	  across	  an	  interconnector	  




EM/2	  MWh	  +	  FFR/2	  
MWh	  
(£/MWh)	  
SO(GB)	   110	   150	   -­‐	  
SO(France)	   140	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
S1(GB)	   120	   -­‐	   290	  
S2(GB)	   -­‐	   120	   240	  
S3(GB)	   -­‐90	   -­‐110	   -­‐200	  
S4(GB)	   -­‐100	   -­‐100	   -­‐190	  
S(France)	   -­‐110	   -­‐90	   -­‐195	  
	  
The	  allocation	  rule	  suggests	  that	  SO(France)	  and	  S3(GB)	  are	  the	  winners	  of	  contract	  EM,	  
S0(France)	   buys	   from	   S3(GB),	   and	   SO(GB)	   and	   S(France)	   are	   the	   winners	   of	   contract	   FFR,	  
SO(GB)	  buys	  from	  S(France).	  Note	  that	  (£140+£150)-­‐(£90+£90)=£110	  is	  greater	  than	  (£290-­‐
£190)=£100.	  The	  payment	  rule	  suggests	  that	  SO(France)	  pays	  £120	  and	  S3(GB)	  is	  paid	  £100	  
and	  S0(GB)	  pays	  £120	  and	  S(France)	  is	  paid	  £100.	  
In	  theory,	  the	  presented	  design	  will	  ensure	  the	  efficiency	  of	  trading	  day-­‐ahead,	  intra-­‐day	  






This	   paper	   presents	   a	   new	   mechanism	   design	   to	   sell	   storage	   products.	   It	   is	   built	   on	  
multiple	  markets	   and	   package	   bidding.	   The	  mechanism	   presented	   is	   the	   VCG	  mechanism	  
that	   is	   based	   on	   social	  welfare	  which	   has	   the	   expected	   features	   –	   truth-­‐telling,	   individual	  
rationality	   and	   efficiency	   –	   and	   results	   in	   simultaneous	   pricing	   of	   the	   different	   products.	  
With	  our	  design,	  storage	  can	  now	  be	  part	  of	  the	  energy	  market	  and/or	  be	  a	  reserve	  supplier	  
or	   demander.	   The	   SO	   is	   part	   of	   the	   design	   and	   therefore,	   it	   is	   given	   the	   opportunity	   to	  
express	   preferences	   on	   offered	   contracts,	   based	   on	   its	   desire	   to	   balance	   the	   system	   in	   a	  
context	   where	   flexibility	   needs	   to	   be	   properly	   priced.	   We	   show	   how	   the	   design	   can	   be	  
extended	  to	  include	  coupled	  electricity	  markets.	  
One	   drawback	   of	   our	   design	   is	   the	   complexity	   of	   package	   bidding,	   which	   is	   a	   general	  
problem	  for	  all	  package	  auctions.	  Package	  bidding	  may	  cause	   less	   sophisticated	  bidders	   to	  
make	  mistakes	   or	   deter	   them	   from	  participating	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   This	  may	   reduce	   social	  
welfare.	  To	  meet	  the	  challenge,	  one	  could	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  proxy	  agents	  (well-­‐known	  in	  
eBay	  auctions,	  see	  e.g.	  Ockenfels	  and	  Roth,	  2002)	  in	  order	  to	  minimise	  the	  potential	  loss	  in	  
welfare.	   The	  mechanism	   could	   offer	   the	   bidders	   to	   submit	   bids	   to	   a	   neutral-­‐programmed	  
proxy	  agent.	  This	  will	  ensure	  some	  kind	  of	  bid-­‐guidance	  or	  limited	  bidding	  combinations	  to	  
simplify	   decisions	   and	   potential	   errors	   from	   bidders.	   Proxy	   bidders	   can	   also	   be	   subject	   to	  
regulation	  which	   reduces	   the	   potential	   for	   gaming.	   This	  will	   secure	   a	   professional	   bidding	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The	  appendix	   shows	   the	  products	   currently	  defined	   in	   Ireland	  and	  potential	  new	  products	  
which	  might	  be	  defined	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  auction	  mechanism	  used	  to	  procure	  them	  and	  how	  
often	  they	  are	  conducted.	  
Table	  6	  
Existing	  products	  in	  Ireland	  












between	  5s	  to	  15s	  
	  






between	  15s	  to	  90s	  
	  






between	  90s	  to	  5min	  
	  






between	  5min	  to	  
20min	  
	  





between	  20min	  to	  1h	  
	  







between	  20min	  to	  1h	  
Regulated	  payments	   Annually	  
	  
Note	  1:	  SEM	  (2013),	  Note	  2:	  IEA-­‐RETD	  (2015),	  Note	  3:	  CER	  (2015)	  
	  
Table	  7	  
New	  products	  in	  Ireland	  
Product1	   Feature1	   Mechanism	   Conducted	  
Synchronous	  Inertial	  
Response	  	  
Immediately	  available	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  





Response	  time	  is	  
within	  2s	  and	  duration	  
is	  at	  least	  8s	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  





Voltage	  control,	  Rise	  
Time	  no	  greater	  than	  
40ms,	  Setting	  Time	  no	  
greater	  than	  300ms 	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  




is	  1h	  and	  duration	  is	  2h
 	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  




is	  3h	  and	  duration	  is	  5h
 	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  




is	  8h	  and	  duration	  is	  8h
 	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
Fast	  Post-­‐Fault	  Active	  
Power	  Recovery	  	  
	  
Must	  remain	  
connected	  to	  the	  
system	  for	  at	  least	  
15min	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
To	  be	  decided	  	  
	  
Note	  1:	  SEM	  (2013)	  
